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The task that now confronts us is primarily
descriptive. It is necessary to learn how the
several sorts of materials stocks on hand and
on order behave, and how that behavior re-
lates to fluctuations in flows of goods or flows
of orders for goods.
Of course, description has no place to start
or stop unless it is related to a question. Two
sorts of questions alternatively provide the
frame of reference that makes description fea-
sible. The firstis, What does the behavior
of the data suggest about possible causal inter-
relations? Second, How do the activities of
stocks participate in economic instability? Ef-
forts to answer these questions form the sub-
stance of Part III.
Here they provide the point of view which
guides how the behavior of the various time
seriesis explored. This and the following
chapter each constitute an examination of
some particular type of information, and focus
on data on stocks and outstanding orders
proper, expressed in dollars or as ratios to
sales; durable goods manufacturers are exam-
ined here and department stores in Chapter 5.
Chapter 6 looks at rates of change in stocks—
inventory investment. Chapters 7 and 8 con-
centrate on the relation between adjacent
flows and the stock pools that they feed or
drain.
The impact of stocks and, with many quali-
fications, of unfilled orders on the flows of
income and output in the economy is meas-
ured primarily by the amount that they in-
crease or decrease, period by period; it is meas-
ured, in other words, by rates of change., How-
ever, the level of stocks and of unfilled orders
constitutes a resource (and in some senses an
obligation) both for the economy at large and
forthe individual company, and thus in-
fluences and reflects a wide variety of judg-
ments. It is necessary therefore to acquire a
firm understanding of characteristic move-
ments of stocks and unfilled orders proper.
Accordingly, we examine, for manufacturers
of durable goods, the levels and patterns of
fluctuations, during postwar years, of mate-
rials on hand and on order. In the second
section we review how these patterns relate
to those of shipments of manufacturers to
their customers.
THE LEVEL OF OWNERSHIP
Manufacturers of durable goods carried "raw"
materials on hand or on order, the book value
of which averaged about $20 billion during
the seventeen years 1946—62. Monthly sales
(shipments) averaged about half that
about $10 billion; that is, the book value of
stocks covered about two months' sales. How-
ever, direct comparison of the two figures is
misleading. In durable goods industries, ma-
terials typically constitute about half of the
value of final sales; the rest of the value ac-
crues in the course of Con-
1Thisestimateis based on the relation between
costs of materials and value of shipments for about70 THE BEHAVIOR OF OWNERSHIP AND ITS PARTS
sequently, materials stocks on hand and on
order, carried on the books at $20 billion,
might have represented on the average the
material required for about four months' sales.
Of total goods on hand and on order, stocks
of materials on hand constituted about a
third; outstanding orders of materials repre-
sented the other two-thirds.2
CONFORMITY AND TIMING
Business Cycles
The level of ownership underwent strong
cyclical fluctuations, as the top curve in Chart
1 shows. Comparison with the shaded areas,
which mark periods designated as business re-
cession according to the National Bureau's
business cycle chronology, indicates that own-
ership tends to conform with general business
conditions with a persistent lead at peaks.
Table 1 sharpens the visual comparisons. The
columns of section A show timing at each
business cycle peak and trough; in the B and
C sections, various summary measures are
given.Typically,durable goods manufac-
turers ceased expanding their ownership of ma-
terials well before peaks in business activities
occurred; the median leadwas four and a
half months (line 1, column B4). During busi-
ness cycle recessions, on the other hand, de-
clining ownership continues just about up to
thirty-fiveofthelargerindustries covered inthe
durable goods field. The basic data were those of the
1958 Census of Manufacturers, Vol.1, Table 3, pp.
1—6 if. Value added is shipments minus cost of ma-
terials, which include also supplies, fuel, purchased
electricity, and construction work. The median ratio
for the various industries of value added to shipments
fell in the upper portion of the .45—.49 size group.
In view of the padded (for our purpose) definition of
materials costs in the Census, the 50 per cent figure
for values added isfar more likely to be too low
than toohigh.Ifsostocks represent a somewhat
larger number of weeks' supply than the text suggests.
2 The analysis of the OBE data inthe previous
chapter makes it clear that there is a wide margin of
error in these figures. Certainly any finding thatis
dependent on fairly close measurements ought to be
rejected. Fortunately the evidence throughout is suf-
ficiently gross to be most unlikely to be vulnerable
to errors in the figures.
3Theterm median is used to apply to the average
of the middle two or three observations.
the trough in business with a lead or a lag
of no more than two months.
Extra Movements
Line 2 of the table uses the "subcycle" ref-
erence scheme. It consists of the business cycle
dates plus two additional movements found
in many economic events. The first was part
and parcel of the transition from a war to a
peace economy. Recessions have notoriously
followed wartime expansion. As some of the
more drastic aspects of the adjustment sub-
sided in late 1946, the usual postwar recession
was thought by many to be due. Of the ex-
ecutives responding to a questionnaire dis-
tributed by Fortune magazine in May 1947,
74 per cent said that they expected conditions
to worsen. Rendigs Fels in a study of "Rec-
ognition of Cyclical Turning Points"dis-
cusses this episode as one of the most blatant
examples of "false declarations" of cyclical
turns. He notes that:
In May 1947, in separate statements, two profes-
sors from the same university used almost identical
language, one saying, "The long expected and
long advertised recession is here," the other saying,
"Beyond question, the long advertised recession is
here." A month later, a news magazine with a
large circulation said, "The nation's bumper crop
of economic forecasterscould now relax,tuck
their thumbs in their vests, and say, 'We told you
so.' The recession had officially begun."
Also, there appears to have been confirmation
as the year rolled on. Fels recounts that:
The mean of the forecasts of industrial produc-
tion made in September by the group of forecasters4. MATERIALS OWNERSHIP, DURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURERS 71
CHART 1
Note: Shaded areas represent business contractions. Specific cycle turns are marked by dots,
additional minor turns by triangles.
aThesum of lines 2 and 3. bPurchasedmaterials stocks for all durable goods industries.
cUnfilledorders for fabricated metals, primary metals, and other durables.d Unfilled orders
for machinery and transportation equipment.
Ownership, Stocks, and Unfilled Orders, Durable Goods Manufacturers, 194 6—64TABLE 1
Timing: Stocks on Hand arid on Order, Durable Goods Manufacturers, 1946—62
Reference
Section A: Months Lead (—) or Lag (+) for Matched
Chronologyb
Turnsa
P T P T P T P T P T P T
Line SeriesC (1/47) (7/47)11/4810/49 (2/51) (6/52) 7/538/547/574/585/602/61
Specific Series: Ownership
1Business cycles —3 —1 —10 +2 —5 +2 —4 —2
2Subcycles —1 +4 —3 —1 e —10 +2 —5 +2 —4 —2
3Outstanding
orders +5 0 0 0 0 0 +6 0 +2 0
4Unfilled orders,
final product —3 —3 0 —4 —7 +2 —5
Specific Series: Stocks of Materials
5Business cycles +3 +3 +1 +4 —5 +4 0 +4
6Subcycles +3 +3 +13 +1 +1 +4 —5 +4 0 +4
7Ownership +6 +4 +11 +2 0 +2 +4 +6
SOutstanding
orders +6 +4 +8 +4 +11 +2 +6 +2 +6 +6
9Unfilled orders,
final product o ® +23 +1 +7 —5 +2 ® +1
Specific Series: Outstanding Orders
10Business cycles —3 —1 —10 +2—11 +2 —6 —2
11Subcycles —6 +4 —3 —1 +5 —3 —10 +2 11 +2 —6 —2
12Unfilled orders,
final product —8 3 4 —7
Specific Series: Unfilled Orders, Final Product
13Business cycles —20 +2 —6 +9 —7 +3
14Subcycles +2 +2 —6 +9 —7 +3
(continued)
aSpecific seriesare matched with the indi-
cated reference series (see note c) in accordance
with the standard NBER rules. A double relaxa-
tion of rules is marked r; it applies to cases for
well-conforming series in which two like turns
are matched, though an unlike turn lies between
them. The figure is underlined when subcycle
chronology is the reference series, a minor cycle
in the specific series has entered a comparison;
or, when two individual series are compared, a
minor cycle in either series has entered a com-
parison. When the business cycle chronology pro-
vides the reference, minor specific cycle turns
are ignored. The meaning of other symbols is:
Turninthe reference series does not
appear in the specific series.
=Turnin the specific series does not ap-
pear in the reference series.
0= Thereis no turn in either series in the
neighborhood of the chronology date.
bchronology dates are business cycle refer-
ence dates.In addition, four minor subeycle
dates, enclosed in parentheses, are added to form
chronology.
cReference series are of three sorts: (1) the
business cycle chronology as shown in column
heads,excluding the dates in parentheses; (2)theTABLE 1(concluded)







Matched Mediane AU Turns





1Business cycles 6 20 4.5+0.5—2.52.01.81.91.9 —2,—3 82
2Subcycles 7 30 —4.0+1.0—1.52.21.83.02.1 —1,—2 75
3Outstanding
orders 0 37 +2.3 0 0 2.30 1.41.1 0 89
4Unfilled orders,
final product 5 10 —1.7—5.03.52.41.32.01.9 3 78
Specific Series:Stocks of Materials
5Business cycles 1 6 1 +0.5+4.0+3.02.20.22.01.3 +3 89
6Subcycles 1 8 1 +1.3+3.7+3.04.30.92.82.6 +3 82
7Ownership 0 7 1 +5.0+3.0+4.03.21.52.42.4 +4 82
8Outstanding
orders 0100 +6.7+3.3+6.0 1.51.31.91.4 +6 81
9Unfilled orders,
final product 1 50+10.7—1.0+1.58.22.75.85.4 +1,+2 70
Specific Series:Outstanding Orders
10Business cycles 6 20 —8.0+0.5—2.53.01.83.92.4 —2,—3 70
11Subcycles 8 40 —6.0+0.5—2.53.82.34.13.1 —2,—3 74
12Unfilled orders,
final product 6 00 —5.3—5.0—4.5 1.81.31.51.5 4,5 77
Specific Series:Unfilled Orders, Final Product
13Business cycles 3 30 —11.0+4.7—2.00.02.97.84.4+2,2to6 61
14Subcycles 2 40 —3.7+4.7+2.03.82.94.23.3 +2 56
subcyclechronology as shown inallcolumn
heads; (3) particular series whose specific cy-
cles and minor cycles constitute the reference
dates for comparison.
dThe number of months during which the spe-
cific series is in like phase with the reference
series is expressed as a percentage of the total
number of months covered between dates as given.
eMedian is the average timing of the center
two or three turns.
f Average deviation from the median.The
"weighted" (wt'd) average is the deviation from
the median for peaks and for troughs separately,
weighted by the number of turns.
determining months in like phase a timing
adjustment is made which maximizes confluence.
Before counting the months in phase, the specific
series is in effect moved to the right to allow for
a lead and to the left to allow for a lag if by so
doing the percentage of months in like phase (as
rounded) is increased. If the months in phase are
as large or larger without an adjustment, this is
indicated by a "timing adjustment" of 0.
In some cases we wish to know the percent-
age of months in phase on a synchronous basis,
regardless of whether the percentage in phase is
thereby maximized. If so, the "timing adjustment"
is given as "none."74 THE BEHAVIOR OF OWNERSHIP AND ITS PARTS
referred to as Set A in this investigation predicted
a decline from a high in the first half of the year,
the decline to continue for the year and a half
covered by the prediction and to aggregate more
than 10 per cent—clearly an amplitude of cyclical
proportions. What isworse, every singlefore-
caster in the group predicted a decline in indus-
trial production.4
In view of the customary lag in forecasts rela-
tive to actual turns,5 it is not surprising that
a wide variety of time series showed a down-
turn which seemed to center in January. 1 had
dated the upturn in July.6
The second episode was associated with the
Korean War, which occasioned a burst of busi-
ness activity in the second half of 1950. It
culminated early in 1951; February was se-
lectedasthe mostrepresentativemonth.
Troughs in many sorts of activities occurred
in June of 1952, though a number, particu-
larly in nondurable goods industries, started
to recover almost a year
The large majority of the economic time
series with which this monograph is concerned
had specific cycle turns which appeared to
be associated with the Korean episode and a
number also with the postwar phantom re-
cession.8 Occasionally, movements in individ-
ual series at these or other times do not qualify
as specific cycle turns according to National
Bureau rules, yet do seem clear interruptions
of the current cyclical phase. It has seemed
unwise to lose sight of such movements for
the purpose of describing the basic behavior
of the times series during business cycles or
4 Rendigs Fels, "Recognition of Cyclical Turning
Points,"unpublishedpaper,NationalBureauof
Economic Research, 1963, p. 32.
5 Fels found it typically to be between three and
six months (ibid., p. 32).
6 Ruth P. Mack, "Notes on Subcycles in Theory and
Practice," American Economic Review, Proceedings,
May 1957, pp. 164—167; also, NBER, Annual Report,
May 1957, pp. 53—56.
7Ibid.
8 Turns in individual series selected by the National
Bureau in accordance with standard procedures are
referred to here as elsewhere as "specific cycle turns."
They are marked on all charts by crosses placed above
(peaks) or below (troughs) the curve.
for comparing one series with another. Ac-
cordingly, additional "minor specific subcycle"
turns have occasionally been selected; they are
shown on the charts by triangles.9
Subcyclical Timing
Timing at subcycles, as line 2 of Table 1
indicates, includes behavior at both business
cycle and the two minor .subcycle turns. Own-
ership as a whole conformed to the first of
the extra (minor) movements largely because
of the strong drop in outstandings after the
abnormalities of wartime expansion receded.
But in the later phases of the Korean War,
ownership leveled rather than dipped. The
timing of ownership with respect to the ref-
erence subcycle chronology was virtually the
same as previously described for business cy-
cles only—a clear lead at all peaks, and mixed
and therefore average synchronous behavior at
troughs.
Characteristically, the two parts of owner-
ship, stocks and outstandings, turn at different
times. Stocks tend to lag the subcycle or cycle
chronology, and by more at troughs than at
peaks (median lags of four and one months,
9Notethatselectionofthese minor movements,
like the selection of specific cycles themselves, is con-
stantly confronting marginal decisions. For example,
the1949-53 expansions instocks of materials and
outstanding orders, the second and third curves on
Chart1,were interrupted by abriefcontraction
early in 1951 or 1952 which was marked as a sub-
cycle. For outstanding orders, the decision teetered
on the margin, but the turns were marked. Ownership
(top curve) had a slightly less clearly delineated hesita-
tionatthat time, and this was not marked. The
marginal character of the selection of specific cycles
isalso evident when, for example, the extra move-
ments in outstanding orders or ownership associated
with troughs in 1947 are compared with other specific
cycles in the same series or with the minor subcycles
marked in material stocks in 1950—51.
The decision not to mark a movement can also be
based on reasons other than that itis too mild. A
strike affects stocks outstanding, orders, and sales, yet
the phenomenon as a whole has a number of highly
particular characteristics. For this reason I have con-
sistently not marked the interruptions of expansion in
1959 associated with the steelstrike;these occurred
in many series.4. MATERIALS OWNERSHIP, DURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURERS 75
respectively, line 6). Outstandings lead strongly
at peaks (median lead of six months, line 11)
and virtually synchronize at troughs. They
share the business cycle pattern previously
described for ownership. Direct comparisons
between stocks and outstandings confirm the•
character of the difference. Line 8 of the table
indicates the lead or lag of stocks at each turn
in outstandings. The median lag isseven
months at peak and three at troughs. And a
lag of six months is the median for all turns.
Moreover, the relationshipisreasonably
systematic. The average deviation from the
median for all turns is only 1.9 months—l.4
months if the average deviation for peaks and
troughs is computed separately and then av-
eraged (line8,last column of section B).
The chart also suggests substantial parallel-
ism in the two series once the inflated un-
filled orders of the immediate postwar years
had been somewhat reduced and stocks cor-
respondingly increased. (This counterpoised
behavior appears again in 1952 and during
the protracted steel strike in 1959.) Section
C of the table indicates that from mid-1946
through 1961 the two series are in like specific
cycle phase for 81 per cent of the months,
after allowing for the average tendency for
orders to lead by half a year. If comparisons
are confined to 1948 and thereafter, 88 per
cent of the months are in like phase. Appar-
ently, then, outstandings exhibit substantial
parallelism to materials stocks and lead them
by a considerable interval,particularlyat
peaks.
A further indication of correlation appears
in the impression that matched episodes in
the two series seem to have about the same
rank order with respect to their severity. The
episodes to be compared can be selected by
turning to Chart 1 and selecting matching ex-
pansion phases in materials stocks on the one
hand and outstanding orders for materials on
the other. They are the rises starting in late
1949 or early 1950, in late 1954, and in 1958;
the first lap of the post 1961 expansion can
also be included by selecting the top of the
first rise in 1962 (which, however, has not
been considered as a candidate for a specific
peak because of the discontinuity of the data
discussed in Chapter 3, page 64).
For both stocks and outstandings the specific
cycle amplitude of the four expansions grew
successively less. Also, in each case the ampli-
tude for stocks was small relative to outstand-
ings—between a quarter and a third the size;
the average ratio was 29.8. This relationship
remained remarkably stable. If this figure is
used to estimate the rise in stocks by applying
it to the rise in outstandings for each episode,
the estimates on the average are within ±9 per
cent of the actual figure.'°
The long lead and considerable parallelism
of the two series have interesting implications.
The parallelism seems to support the sugges-
tion to which the analysis of business problems
pointed—that outstandings and stocks on hand
had an intimate dynamic interrelationship.
However, the length of the lead of outstand-
ingsispuzzling. The average number of
months' supply held as stocks on order has
probably not exceeded four months since
1947, or two and a half since 1953.11 If this
average tenancy period is the critical figure,
it would seem that a decline or rise in out-
standings would be transmitted to materials
stocks via the inverse vestibule effects in far
less time than leads at peaks ranging from six
to eleven months imply. It will be useful to
keep this puzzle in mind in the hope that
additional information bearing on it will be
uncovered.
10Theratios of the specific rise in stocks to those
of outstandings during four matched episodes were
24.9, 33.2, 31.2, and 29.0. The average of these figures
is 29.8. For each episode the rise in outstandings in
dollars was multiplied by 29.8 to estimate the rise in
stock for the corresponding periods. The estimated
rise was divided by the actual rise and subtracted
from 100 to get the percentage error or estimate. The
errors for the four episodes were + 19.4, —10.2, —4.0,
+ 2.6.
11Theestimates are based on doubling the ratio of
unfilled orders to sales on the assumption that ma-
terials represent about half the value of final product
and value added the other half.76 THE BEHAVIOR OF OWNERSHIP AND ITS PARTS
Unfilled Sales Orders
By way of digression, itis interesting to
compare unfilled orders forfinal products
(the unfilled sales orders of the transportation
equipment and machinery industries) with
the outstanding orders placed by these com-
panies for materials (goods produced by the
fabricated metals, primary metals, and "other
durables" industries). Total unfilled orders
for the durable goods industries is the sum of
those for the two groups. As the two lower
curves on the chart suggest, the book value of
unfilled orders for final products since 1951
averaged about twice that of the materials.
A comparison of the two curves throws light
on the relation between unfilled orders for the
product a company sells (often referred to
as "back orders" or backlogs of unfilled orders
in management literature) and unfilled orders
for the materials a company buys (called ma-
terials orders outstanding, outstandings, or
stock on order). The latter are, of course,
"back orders" of producers of materials.
The two groups of unfilled orders behaved
very differently. The decline in backlogs that
followed the buildup of World War II was
interrupted in 1948 for materials, but not
appreciablyforfinalproducts.Thereis
another sharp contrast after the Korean War,
when the continued upward movement of
orders for final products indicated that produc-
tion did not catch up with shipments of ma-
chinery and transportation equipment (includ-
ing automobiles) for almost two years after
balance had been restored in orders and ship-
ments of materials. The huge backlogs of
orders for durable equipment must certainly
have tended to cushion the jar to economic
expansion created by the post-Korean declines
in many other lines. The 1954—58 movement
was found in both series, but this time the
percentage movement of final products was
weaker than that of materials. From 1958
through 1962, unfilled orders for final prod-
ucts remained virtually constant, while those
for materials moved in conformity with the
cyclical tides of the period as well as with
the temporary dip of early 1962. In general,
it is clear that outstanding orders for materials
respond sensitively to even minor business
fluctuations, whereas those for finished ma-
chinery and transportation equipment take
much more to set them in motion. As a result,
many of the movements in outstanding orders
for materials are unmatched by similar ones
for final products. Line 12 of Table 1 shows
that only six turns could be matched.
These facts about behavior do not seem out
of line with the firm's-eye view. The size of
back orders for the product a company sells
affects the risk involved in advance orders for
materials. Consequently itis reasonable to
find that the former never fluctuated without
corresponding fluctuations in the latter. How-
ever, since the presence of sizable back orders
is only one of the things influencing ordering
policy for materials, there is no reason why
materials buying cannot undergo fluctuations,
manifested in changing outstanding orders, at
times when back orders for final product are
level.
Perhaps also reflecting the variety of in-
fluences that shape the course of materials
outstanding,turns inoutstandingsalways
preceded those in unfilled orders whenever
they occurred. The median lead was five
months (Table 1, line 12). Thus backlogs of
sales orders were still increasing when pur-
chasedmaterialsoutstanding had already
started to decline; similarly, backlogs were still
falling when outstandings had started to rise.
These facts seem to support the general
notion that itis useful to separate unfilled
orders for final products and for intermediate
products, at least until the character and cause
of their heterogeneity is more adequately un-
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TABLE 2
Reference Cycle Amplitude of Stocks and Outstanding Materials Orders,
Durable Goods Mane facturers,a 1946—62
(billion dollars)
A: Rise or Fall (-)DuringReference Phases
Contrac-Expan-Contrac-Expan-Contrac-Expan-Contrac-
tion sion tion sion tion sion tion
11/48— 10/49— 7/53— 8/54— 7/57— 4/58— 5/60—
10/49 7/53 8/54 7/57 4/58 5/60 2/61
1.Ownership —4.09 13.61 —8.59 5.83 —4.70 2.10 —2.04
2.Materials stocks —.91 3.04 —.86 1.47 —.43 .81 —.78
3.Outstanding orders —3.18 10.57 —7.73 4.36 —4.28 1.29 —1.26
4.All stocks —1.48 11.98 —2.29 7.77 —2.20 2.65 —1.50
B: Average Rise or Fall (—)During
Reference Phases
Amplitude as % of
Amplitude of Materials
Per Phase Per MOfltha Stocksb
Expan-Contrac-Expan-Contrac- All Expan-Contrac-All
sion tion sion tionPhasession tionPhases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1.Ownership 7.18 —4.86 .205 —.462 .219 402 651 390
2.Materials stocks 1.77 —.75 .051 —.07 1 .056 100 100 100
3.Outstanding orders 5.40 —4.11 .154 —.392 .222 302 552 396
4.All stocks 7.47 —1.87 .213 —.178 .204 417 250 364
Note: The measures are those of standard NBER business cycle analysis.
aper month amplitude measures are the sum of the rises divided by the total number of months of
cyclical expansion and analogously for contractions. For the total, falls (carrying a negative sign) are
subtracted from total rises and divided by the number of months between first and last peak or trough.
bPermonth amplitude of each series as a percentage of the corresponding figure for materials stocks.
AMPLITUDE
Ownership and each of its components under-
went substantial cyclical fluctuation. Stock on
order had a far wider amplitude of movement
than did stocks on hand. During the three
reference cycle expansions occurring between
1948 and 1962, the book value of stocks on
order increased on the average by $5.4 billion
(Table 2, column Bi) and during the four
reference cycle contractions fell on the average
by $4.1 billion. The corresponding figures for
materials stocks on hand were $1.8 and $.8
billion respectively. Thus the cyclical rise in
outstandings was, on the average, about three
times that of materials stocks and the fall78 THE BEHAVIOR OF OWNERSHIP AND ITS PARTS
TABLE 3
Average Specific Cycle Amplitude Per Month of Materials Stocks on
Durable Goods Manufacturers, 1946-62
Hand and on Order,
Date of First
and Last PeakNo. of
Amplitude Per Month
($





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1.Ownership P 12/46 to
P2/62 5 .308 —.367 .333 417 456 436
2.Materials stocks P2/49 to












.309 396 408 404
4.All stocks T1/46 to




aAmplitude measures are the sum of the rises minus the sum of the falls divided by the number of
months between the first and last peak or trough. Thus the rise and fall during each specific cycle
(carrying a negative sign) are weighted by its duration.
bThe amplitude of outstandings beginning 8/48 is compared with that of materials stocks in order
to match the time periods as nearly as possible.
°Amplitude for outstandings as percentage of all stocks.
about five times (columns B6 and 7).12The
level of outstandings proper, it will be re-
called, was only about twice that of materials
stocks. The first part of Table 2 gives the
phase-by-phase figures.
Even compared with total stocks of durable
goods manufacturers, outstandings show strik-
ing fluctuations. Comparison of the last two
lines in the table indicates that during con-
tractions (column B7) the cyclical amplitude
of the average book value of outstanding or-
ders for durable materials was over twice that
of total stocks of the durable goods industries
(stocks of finished and in-process goods and
12Thedifference in the relationship for rises and
falls was partly due to the fact that there was little
trend rise in book value of outstandings and a sub-
stantial one in stocks.
materials) and about three quarters of it dur-
ing expansions.If these book-value figures
were converted to months of supply (a con-
version that would raise the weight of raw
and in-process materials relative to finished
goods),theratios would besubstantially
higher.13
Reference cycle amplitudes are influenced
by the degree to which each series conforms
to business cycles. This element can be re-
moved by comparing amplitude during cycles
specific to each series. Table 3 gives the figures.
Comparison of column 5 in the two tables
shows that a substantial portion—between two-
isAlso,it will be recalled that the series excludes
materials bought from dealers or other nonmanu-
facturers.4. MATERIALS OWNERSHIP, DURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURERS 79
thirds and three-quarters—of the total specific
fluctuation in these several stockpiles occurred
during the times of general economic fluctua-
tion as designated by the reference subcycle
chronology. The tables also show that the
relative instability of outstandings compared
with stocksis somewhat greater when the
full specific rises and falls of each aggregate
are taken into account than when the ref-
erence framework is used (compare column 8
in the two tables). Apparently, if outstandings
havethecapacitytoinfluence economic
events, their influence will tend to reinforce
the business tides.
FIRST THRUST OF EXPANSIONS
Outstanding orders seem to share the char-
acteristics often observed in stocks—they fall
at a faster rate during business contractions
than they rise during expansions, thereby sug-
gesting that they push things down with more
force than they lift them up. The average
monthly rate of rise of outstanding orders dur-
ing the expansion phases of business cycles
(beginning with the 1949 troughs) was $160
million per month; during contractions the
monthly rate of fall averaged $400 million.14
But further examination reveals an interest-
ing variation on this usual theme: outstanding
orders rise with far more vigor in the early
months of expansion than in the later ones.
This impression isalso conveyed by Chart
1.
Table 4 formalizes the comparisons by using
athree-part reference framework. Business
cycle expansions are divided into two pieces
and contractions are treated in the conven-
tional way. The first sections of expansions
are delineated by the additional minor peaks
that were mentioned earlier—January 1947
and February 1951. We also select two further
dates. The first, December 1955, was,a candi-
date subcycle peak which was considered in
the course of the work on subcycles, but it
was rejected because the break in expansion
was not sufficiently diffused among different
sorts of economic activity. However, many
series appeared to reach temporary peaks in
14Thefigures are based on standings for the single
month of peaks and troughs and are rounded to tens
of millions of dollars. They are therefore not identical
to those in Table 2, line 3, columns 3 and 4.
their expansion at about that time. The second
date, March 1959, marks the time when the
anticipatory action associated with the steel
strike a few months later seemed to reach its
zenith. Note that these four peak dates oc-
curredfifteen,sixteen,sixteen, and eleven
months after the previous business cycle ref-
erence troughs marked in 1945, 1949, 1954,
and 1958 respectively. It is interesting, inci-
dentally, that these periods are quite uniform
in length and also typically a bit longer than
postwar contractions (compare columns 5 and
15). Table 4 indicates that in three of the
four episodes the total cyclical rise in out-
standings had been effected during these first
periods—the standing at subpeaks is usually
higher than at subsequent peaks (columns 7
and 8). For all of them, the average monthly
rate of expansion was entirely comparable to
that of contractions (bottom two lines,col-
umns 12 and 19).
The large proportion of the rise that oc-
curred in the first phase of expansion could
be due in part to the strong tendency for
outstandings to experience peaks ahead of the
business cycle high points. Table 5, therefore,
converts the comparisons to a specific cycle
basis. The specific cycle peaks or troughs in
outstandings that are matched with business
cycle peaks or troughs provide the dates for
columns 1,2,10, and 11. The first period
of thrusts is selected as the months when, in
the course of itsfirstspecific cycle rise in
reference expansion, the rate of rise in out-
standings has reached its maximum and de-
clined to the halfway mark between its maxi-80 THE BEHAVIOR OF OWNERSHIP AND ITS PARTS
TABLE 4
Amplitude of Outstanding Materials Orders During Reference CyclePhases and First
Subcycle Expansion,a Durable Goods Manufacturers, 1946-62
Interval (months)
Reference Dates Trough to:Standings ($ billion)b
Rise ($ biflion)
Total Per Month
Cycle Sub C. Cycle Sub C. Trough Peak Sub Peaka Peak Sub Peak Trough Peak Sub Peak
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)(11)(12)
Expansions
1/46C 11/48 1/47 34 (l2)d 9.511.1 12.5 1.6 3.00.050.25
10/497/53 2/51 45 16 7.918.6 17.9 10.710.00.240.62
8/547/5712/55 35 16 10.715.2 15.5 4.5 4.80.130.30
4/585/603/59 25 11 10.712.2 14.5 1.5 3.80.060.35
Average, 1/46 to 2/61 34.8 4.6 5.3 •39e
Average, 11/48 to 2/6135.0 14.3 5.6 6.2.16e•43e
Reference Dates Standingsb ($ billion)
Interval
Peak Trough (months) Peak Trough
Fall ($ billion)
Total Per Month
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
Contractions
11/48 10/49 11 11.1 7.9 —3.2 —0.29
7/53 8/54 13 8.6 10.7 —7.9 —0.61
7/57 4/58 9 15.2 10.7 —4.5
5/60 2/61 9 12.2 10.8 —1.4 —0.16
Average, 1/46 to 2/61 —4.2
Average, 11/48 to 2/6110.5 11.8 10.2 —4.2
aTwo of the dates are part of a previously selected subcycle chronology; two are otherwise
chosen.
bStandings are for the single month of peak or trough. Therefore figures may differ slightly
from those of Table 2, where standings are three-month averages.
CFirst month for which data are available.
dThe interval from the business cycle trough in October 1945 was fifteen months.
eSum of the rises (falls) divided by the total number of months of expansion (contraction)
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TABLE 5
Amplitude of Outstanding Materials Orders During Selected Specific Cycles and




10/548/566/55 22 8 6.6 3.30.300.41
8/566/5822 —6.6—0.30







troughs. The first period of thrust starts at the specific trough and ends at the month when, in the
course of itsfirst specific cycle rise of reference expansion, the rate of rise (as measured by a five-
month centered average of month-to-month change) has reached its maximum and declined to halfway
between its maximum and zero. Failing the necessary information for the first period, the peak date of
the first specific cycle was used.
bBased on standings for the month of peak or trough only.
CFirst month when data are available.
dperiod from beginning of the data, not from the previous trough.
mum and zero?5 The intervals ranged from
eight to nineteen months, and the shorter
figure seems more typical. Comparison of col-
15Theselection was made on the basis of a five-
month moving average of month-to-month change as
shown in Chart 6, below. Some time after outstandings
proper have reached their specific cycle trough as-
sociated with the reference cycle trough, the rate of
rise in outstandings reaches a peak. Some months later
outstandings cease torise. (The five-month average
crosses the zero line on its way down.) The month
when the five-month average has declined to a figure
closest to one-half its peak level marks the termina-
tion of the first specific cycle thrust.
umns 9 and 14 of Table 5 shows that the
monthly rates of rise during these periods of
first thrust are stronger than during contrac-
tion. A large part of specific cycle expansion
usually occurred during these first episodes
(compare columns 6 and 7).
After the first two thrusts, outstandings de-
clined for a while and then rose again, thus
producing extra movements which, as men-
tioned previously, were also found in many
other economic areas. In 1959, too, the thrust















b ($billions) Top of
TroughPeakThrustaPeak ThrustsionThrust(6+4)c(7±5)Peak Trough(mos.)Total Per Mo.





36 19 13.2 12.10.370.64
8/489/49 13 —4.1—0.32
aOnly those specific cycles are included whose
21.7 .25 .53
19.3 .32 .54 7325.1 .34
are matched with business cycle reference82 THE BEHAVIOR OF OWNERSHIP AND ITS PARTS
CHART 2
Relations Among Outstanding Orders, Stocks, and Shipments,
Durable Goods Manufacturers, 1946—64
Ratio Billion dollars
1946'47 '48'49'50'515253'545556'57'58
Note:Shaded areas represent business contractions. Specific cycle turns are marked by dots,
additional minor turns by triangles.4. MATERIALS OWNERSHIP, DURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURERS 83
short duration and close association with the
extended steel strike gives it a somewhat collo-
quial interest. The movement that ended in
1955 resulted in a flattening rather than an
actual downturn.
In general the figures suggest that insofar
as an increase of materials on order tends to
stimulate more ordering than would other-
wise take place (and consequently more busi-
ness activity), the chief impact of stimulation
occurs in the first year or year and a half of
expansion.
Though stocks of materials on hand also
tend to flatten by the middle of expansion,
the strong early upward surge of materials on
its way to factory floors concentrates particu-
larly in the most responsive portion of owner-
ship—outstanding orders. The proportion of
total ownership that consists of outstanding
orders rises to a peak early in expansion and
then flips downward. This can be seen in the
next to the last curve in Chart 2, the ratio
of outstanding orders to stocks of materials.
The bottom line in the chart suggests that
a similar pattern characterizes the relation of
materials to finished stocks. Taken together,
the curves seem to depict a moving bulge in
the pipelines of materials; it starts in the first
section, the outstanding orders for materials,
and slips toward later sections as expansion
continues. During contraction it moves much
farther in that direction.
RELATION BETWEEN SALES AND STOCKS
The economic meaning of the size of a stock
reservoir depends in part on its relation to
the flow of goods or services to which itis
linked.
Any business must, of course, maintain some
sort of positive association between the vol-
ume of stocks and sales. But the analysis of
Chapter 2 suggests that it is not at all clear
what that association is likely to be. It is the
joint result of the physical necessities of serv-
icing sales (and the sales relation alone is
most efficiently handled by a less than pro-
portionate change in stock), changes in op-
portunity costs which may or may not parallel
sales, changes in expectations about market
conditions, and errors which it is not worth-
while to reverse immediately. Obviously, then,
it is pertinent to ask how these ratios actually
behave. Do stocks tend to maintain a system-
atic relation to sales or shipments and,if
so,isit a constant one or one that is posi-
tively or negatively associated with shipments?
How about these relations for outstanding
purchase orders or ownership as a whole?
What is the meaning, in terms of business
problems and practices, of such relationships
as the time series show? In this section some
gross behavioral characteristics are exhibited.
In Chapter 9 we explore the question of
"why."
Parallelism in Sales and Stocks
The behavior of shipments and of stocks
both on hand and on order in durable goods
manufacturing are compared in the first three
lines in Chart 2 and detailed timing com-
parisons appear in Table 6.
The chart reveals a family resemblance be-
tween shipments and stocks of materials on
hand and on order. But it certainly suggests
that stocks on hand follow shipments more
closely than do stocks on order. The latter,
as the analysis of earlier chapters suggests, are
likely to reflect, among other things, conditions,
or expectations about conditions, in the mar-
kets in which materials are bought and sold.
The eye picks up notable differences in the
contours of the waves in outstandings and
shipments (curves 3 and 1), whereas stocks
on hand move more similarly to shipments
(curves 2 and 1). Table 6 supports these im-
pressions. In line 4 of section C we see that
during 84 per cent of the months from mid-84 THE BEHAVIOR OF OWNERSHIP AND ITS PARTS
TABLE 6
Timing: Shipments, Durable Goods Manufacturers, 1946—62
Reference
Line Series0
Section A: Months Lead (—)orLag (+) for Matched Turnsa
Chronologyb
p T P T P T P T P T P T




+1 0 0 +2 —6 0 —11 —1
+1 0 +1 -i-1 0 +2 —6 0 —11 —1
3Shipments
Specific Series: Ownership
—4 —1 ® —10 0 +1 +2 +7 —1
4Shipments
Specific Series:Stocks of Materials
+2 +3 .±12.. +1 +2 +1 +4+11+5
5Shipments
Specific Series:Outstanding Orders
—4 —1jj. —10 0 —5 +2 +5 —1
6Shipments
Specific Series:Unfilled Orders, Final Product
—21 +2 6 +7 1 +4
Reference
Line SeriesC
Section B: Average Timing of Turns
Section C: Percentage of
Average Deviation1Months in Like Phased
Number Timing % Mos.
Matched Mediane All Turns Adjust- 7/46—.




323 —3.0 0 04.5 0.82.62.6 0 80
343 —1.7+0.3 0 4.10.92.32.5 0 84
3Shipments
Specific Series: Ownership
431 —1.5—0.5—0.55.51.03.23.2 —1,0 72
4Shipments
Specific Series:Stocks of Materials
091 +4.7+3.0+2.54.71.42.93.1 +2,+3 84
5Shipments
Specific Series:Outs tan ding Orders
631 —1.7—0.7—1.05.31.53.43.4 —1 73
6Shipments
Specific Series:Unfilled Orders, Final Product
220 —9.3+4.5—1.77.82.5 7.35.6 —1 62
For notes see Table 1.4. MATERIALS OWNERSHIP, DURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURERS 85
1946 to the end of 1961, shipments and ma-
terials stocks are in like phase after allowing
for a lag of either two or three months. For
both ownership and outstanding orders, the
association with shipments is nearly synchro-
nous on the average (or leading slightly for
outstandings), and this is an interesting fact.
However, the months in like phase are low
(72 or 73 per cent). For all these data, troughs
behave systematically; average deviations in
the timing of shipments and the stock or out-
standings series are very small (column B8).
It will be recalled that this was also charac-
teristic of the association of materials stocks
(and, to a lesser extent, the other stock data
too) with troughs in business cycles, and the
statistical reason is simply that it is also true
of troughs in shipments. The economic mean-
ing, on the other hand, is equivocal since the
reversal in the stock aggregates could very
well be causally associated with change in
sales or in the business climate, or both.
Stock-Sales Ratios, Trend and Fluctuations
In any event, it is certainly no surprise to
see manufacturers increasing their raw mate-
rials on hand and on order when their ship-
ments to customers rise, and decreasing them
as they fall off. But how about the particular
character of theassociation? Chart 3ad-
ratios of end-of-month stocks to shipments dur-
dresses itself to this question by depicting the
ing the month. The shaded areas show the
periods when business cycles were in falling
phase. These curves tell, I think, a very in-
teresting story.
First, a word concerning their level and
trend. One would like to gauge the size of
stocks in terms of the number of months' sales
for which they provide. But this is not shown
by the ratio because,as suggested earlier,
stocks are measured in terms of the value of
"raw materials" and shipments in terms of
the value of finished goods, and consequently,
to make a unit-for-unit comparison, the value
of materials must at least be doubled.'° Thus
the scale for the center three lines should be
multiplied by two to indicate approximately
the number of months' sales for which pro-
visions have been made. So viewed, materials
stocks on hand typically constitute about five
weeks' sales(stock-sales ratio of.6in the
chart) for the period as a whole. But the
trend has been downward, and this is not
merely a reflection of early adjustments to
peacetime conditions. Though there may have
been some stabilization in the fifties, the last
several years have seen a further decline to
about one month's provisions (ratio of .5).
Materials on order were, for the period as
a whole, substantially larger than those on
hand; they averaged just short of two and a
half months' sales, and, as the discussions at
the end of Chapter 3 indicate, this must be
regarded as a rough approximation. They
shared the downward trend relative to sales,
but to a more marked degree.
In view of the relative decline in both stocks
of materials on hand and on order,the
constant relation of total stocks to shipments
may seem surprising (bottom curve). Yet actu-
ally it probably is more of an explanation
than a contradiction. Stock in process kept
a relatively steady relation to shipments. The
increase in finished stocks relative to stocks
of materials—and relative also, and particu-
larly so, to outstanding orders for materials—
can be interpreted as reflecting a long-term
shift from a seller's to a buyer's market.
Turn now to the cyclical patterns of the
stock-shipments ratio, which, if my interpreta-
tion is correct, may also have some bearing
on their trends. A swift glance at Chart 3
answers one question of some general import.
Ignoring trends, are stocks-sales ratios approxi-
mately constant? They are not. The vertical
scale of the chart is proportional and has the
16Thereason, to repeat, is that an examination of
census data for a number of major durable goods in-
dustries suggests that, very typically in durable goods
manufacture,the value added by manufactureis
about equal to the cost of the materials and fuels.86 THE BEHAVIOR OF OWNERSHIP AND ITS PARTS
same dimensions as that used for the previous
charts. Accordingly, the picture suggests that
the magnitude of fluctuation in the ratios is
substantial. (Compare it with that of the data
proper in Chart 1.) Table 7, lines 1, 4, and
7, shows the average standing of the ratios,
converted to estimated weeks' supply, at their
specificpeaks and troughs,1948through
1961.17
On the average, materials represented one
more week's supply at peaks than at troughs
in the ratio (column 3), about one-fifth more
than the five-week supply typical at troughs
(column 4). For ownership and outstandings,
an additional four weeks' supply was usual,
and this constituted about one-third more
for ownership and one-half more for outstand-
ings than the average position at troughs.
Clearly, then, if manufacturers were trying
to achieve a constant relation between sales
and any of the three stock aggregates, they
were not succeeding. Moreover, there is no
reason to suppose that they could not do
so if the objective carried a sufficient priority.
For ownership, adjustment to a desired figure
could be achieved almost immediately by ap-
propriate changes in new orders; even for
stock of materials on hand, foreknowledge of
demand, often supplied by advance sales and
orders, would make it possible to gauge ma-
terials buying so as to validate a stock ob-
jective if it were worth the cost.
Relationship of Ratios to Shipments
But granted that the figures suggest that a
constant sales-stock ratio is not a high-priority
management objective, what are the character-
istics of the relation that actually does obtain?
Is it, for example, the inverse relation of the
ratio to the level of sales which would be
produced if the single factor influencing stocks
17Iuse the assumptions that materials constitute
half of the price of finished goods and that there are
four and a third weeks to the average month. Ac-
cordingly, the monthly book-value figures are multi-
plied by 8.67.
were an efficient link to sales, other things
the same? Here again, the answer is no.
Study of Chart 3 makes it clear that the
ratio of materials stocks to shipments is in-
creasing during substantial periods when ship-
ments are increasing too. These are certainly
periods when stocks could be cut down if it
were clearly desirable to do so. A similar re-
mark applies to the ratios for ownership and
stocks on order. Column 5 of Table 7 shows
that the three ratios (for stocks, outstandings,
and ownership) are in rising specific cycle
phase during 44, 47, and 37 per cent respec-
tively of the months when shipments are in
rising specific cycle phase. Column 4 indicates,
in lines 2, 5, and 8, that the range between
the high and the lows in the ratio, which are
reached when sales are rising, is,of course,
less than their total specific cycle range (lines
1, 4, and 7),butnevertheless not insignificant;
the high is 110 to 146 per cent of the low.
The particular times in the cycles in ship-
ments when the ratios rise and fall are worth
some attention, and Table 8 gives the figures.
The specific cycle lows in the stock-shipment
ratio occurred after shipments had started to
rise, indeed never less than seven nor more
than twelve months thereafter (Table 8, line
7). Typically, the last few months' fall in the
ratio was due to the fact that though stocks
were rising, shipments were rising faster. But
itis noteworthy that this situation did not
last for long: within the first year of the ex-
pansion in shipments, stocks started to rise
faster than shipments (the ratio began to rise).
An exception, however, was the phase start-
ing in 1961, when the ratio flattened for a
while and then continued to fall.
The ratio was usually still rising—that is,
the number of months' supply held in stock
was increasing—when shipments reached their
peak and started to decline. But since stocks
themselves reversed very promptly, the con-
tinued rise of •the ratio was due to the fact
that stocks did not fall as fast as shipments.
Again, thelast complete expansion phase,
the one with a peak in 1959, was an exception.4. MATERIALS OWNERSHIP, DURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURERS 87
TABLE 7
Average Amplitude and Conformity of Stock-Shipment Ratios During Expansion Phases
Variously Defined, Durable Goods Manufacturers, 1948—61










Standing ofRatios, Weeksa During Expansion
b Phases of: Standing at Peaks Peaks















































aThe individual standingsare two-month averages of monthly data for peak (trough) month andthe
higher (lower) of the two adjacent months. If the peak (trough) was erratically high (low), a three-month
centered average was used. Monthly data were converted to weeks by assuming that there are 4.5 weeks
per month, The figures average the individual standings for the fourteen years from the beginning of 1948
to the end of 1961.
bThesearethe same measures as those appearing in section C of the timing tables except that they
areconfined to the periods when the reference scheme (specific cycles in sales for column 5 and busi-
nesscycle chronology in column 6)is in rising phase. Comparisons are made without a timing adjustment.
CBasedon average standings (not on standing for each phase averaged).
dStandingsare taken at specific cycle peaks and troughs in the ratio.
eThepeak standingis that of the high reached in the ratio during each specific cycle in shipments.
Troughstanding is that of the specific cycle trough in the ratio that is matchedwith each specific cycle
troughin shipments.
peak standing is thatof the high reached in the ratio during each businesscycle expansion.
Trough standing is that of the specific cycle trough in the ratio that is matched with each reference
trough.88 THE BEHAVIOR OF OWNERSHIP AND ITS PARTS
TABLE 8




P T P T P T P T P T P T
Line Series0 (1/47)(7/47)11/4810/49(2/51)(6/52) 7/538/547/574/585/602/61
Specific Series:Ratioof Ownership to Shipments
1Business cycles ÷8 —24 ÷4—12 +8 —6
2Subcycles e +8 +5 ÷4—12 +8 —6
3Shipments, all
durables 0 0 +8 +4 +2 —6 +8 +5
4Ownership +9 —14 0 +2 —7 +6 —2
SpecificSeries:Ratio of Purchased Materials Stocks to Shipments
5Business cycles +3 +10 +4+11 +8+12 +8
6Subcycles +3 ÷10 +10 +8 +4+11 +8÷12 +8
7Shipments, all
durables +2 +10 ÷9 ÷7 +4 +9+14+12÷19r
8Stocks 0 +7 —3 ÷7 +3 +7 +13 +8 +8
9R:ownershipto
shipments ÷3 +2 +5 +7+20 +4÷4 0
10R:outstanding to
shipments +11 +5 +12+20 +4+14 0
SpecificSeries:Ratio of Outstanding Orders to Shipments
11Business cycles —1 —24 --1—12 +8 —6
12Subcycles e —1 +5 0 0 —1—12 +8 —6
13Shipments, all
durables 0 0 0 -1 +4 e 0 -3-6 +8+5 0
14Outstandings 0 0 0 0 0 0 —3 —1 +6 0 0
15R:materials stocks
to shipments 0 —11 —5 0 0 —12—20 —4—14 0
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TABLE 8 (concluded)
















Wt'd P T All
Specific Series: Ratio of Ownership to Shipments
1Business cycles33 0 —14.0-f6.7—1.0 6.71.8 4.2 None 51
2Subcycles 24 0 —4.3+6.7+4.5 6.21.85.84.0 None 54
3Shipments, all
durables 15 0 +1.0+6.0-1-4.54.7 2.73.53.7 None 60h
4Ownership 33 0 —7.7+5.7 04.2 2.46.73.3 0 64
Specific Series:Ratio of Purchased Materials Stocks to Shipments
5Business cycles07 0 +6.0 +11.0+8.7 2.2 0.7.2.71.6 None 51
6Subcycles 0 11 0 ÷7.5÷9.7+8.0 2.01.51.91.8 0 48
7Shipments, all
durables 09 0 +9.0+9.5+9.35.41.53.73.7 0
8Stocks 171 ÷3.7+7.0+7.0 4.90.53.23.0 +7 79
9R:ownership to
shipments 07 0 +9.5+4.3+5.3 6.41.84.64.4 +5 69
10R:outstandings
to shipments 06 0+13.0÷9.5 +11.5 5.3 3.34.34.3 +11, +12 73
Specific Series:Ratio of Outstanding Orders to Shipments
11Business cycles51 0 —14.0+2.0—3.5 6.74.08.05.3 0 57
12Subcycles 42 0 —4.3+2.0—1.06.24.05.25.1 0 60
13Shipments, all
durables 33 0 +1.0+1.3+1.5 4.74.44.54.6 0,—1,+1,+2 63
14Outstandings 2 13 —0.3+1.0 00.4 3.31.71.9 0 79
15R:material stocks
to shipments 60 0 —13.0—9.5 —11.5 5.3 3.34.34.2 —11,—i 73
For notes a through g, see Table 1.
hAdjustmentsthat maximize percentage in phase are, respectively, line 3:+2, 68 per cent; line 7:
+9 or +10, 72 per cent..90 THE BEHAVIOR OF OWNERSHIP AND ITS PARTS
The ratio did not rise during the expansion
in shipments starting in 1958; it fell most of
the time.
Materialsstocks on order, measured in
months ofsales,declined uninterruptedly
from wartime highs until the end of the 1949
recession. Thereafter they had two bold rises
with subsequent bold falls and a less bold
episode in 1958—60. Both troughs and peaks
in these waves occurred much earlier than in
the stock-on-hand ratio, and the outstandings-
shipment ratiothereforetendedtoreach
troughs much closer to the upturn in ship-
ments than did the stock-on-hand-shipments
ratio; indeed it even turned earlier than ship-
ments at two of the three comparisons (Table
8, line 13). In other words, a rise in shipments
and an increase in the number of months'
supply on order tended to occur around the
same time. Chart 3 shows another fact worth
noting. Apparently the rise in materials out-
standing that started early in 1961 was no
greater than necessary to maintain a constant
number of months' sales on order. The ratio
slid continuously downward from late 1959 to
the beginning of 1964, when it again turned
up.
Behavior During Business Cycles
The tendency for stocks to rise when sales
do is a well-explored aspect of business cycle
dynamics. If stocks tend to rise even faster
than do sales, this tendency for stocks to add
toorpartlygeneratecyclicalfluctuation
would thereby be emphasized. Accordingly, it
is interesting to ask how the stock-sales ratio
behaves during business cycles and particu-
larly during cyclical expansions. Do stocks of
materials tend to rise faster than shipments
at times when business as a whole is expand-
ing? If so, there is a tendency to add an ele-
ment to the leavening influence.
Column 6 of Table 7 is addressed to this
question and it shows that materials stocks
are rising faster than shipments (which, of
course, also tend to rise during expansion)
during 52 per cent of the months of reference
expansion 1948 through 1961. The range of
fluctuation comprehends very nearly all of the
conforming specific fluctuation in the ratio
(compare lines 1 and 3, column 4). Materials
stocks on order, because of the long leads at
peaks, were rising for a smaller proportion
of cyclical expansion than stocks on hand; the
figure was 44 per cent, which, though smaller,
is still not insubstantial. However, the full im-
pact of the specific rise in the ratio occurred
during months of cyclical expansion; peaks
occurring during expansion were about 50 per
cent higher than troughs—an extra four weeks'
supply (Table 7, line 6, columns 3 and 4).
Generally similar observations apply to total
ownership.
Manufacturers'purchasingofmaterials,
then, tended to add to other forces of expan-
sion not only by causing an absolute rise in
materials on hand and on order but a rise
proportionately greater than that of the rise
in shipments of finished goods.
The behavior of purchasing at the very
start of cyclical expansion is interesting. In 1949
and in 1954 the outstandings-shipment ratio
began increasing one month before the cyclical
trough dates. Accordingly, part of what I have
called the first thrust of expansion consisted
in this increase in the number of weeks' supply
on order. For materials on hand, the number
of weeks' supply went down at first, and, as
we shall see in Chapter 9, this is not without
significance. But a few months before the
terminal dates of periods of "thrust," stocks
started to rise relative to sales and continued
to do so for some months after the outstand-
ings-shipments ratio started to decline.
The expansion starting early in 1961 was
different in several respects from the earlier
postwar movements. Though outstanding ma-
terials orders rose as usual about the same
time that business reached its low, they did
not rise relative to shipments. (It will be re-
called, incidentally, that unfilled orders for
final product did not rise at all.) The stock-




Relationof Stocks and Unfilled Orders to Shipments,










1946 7'48'49'50'5 l'52'53'54 '55 56 '57
Note:Shaded areas represent business contractions. Specific cycle turns are marked by dots,
additional minor turns by triangles.
aRatioof finished, in process, and materials stocks of all durable goods manufacturers to
shipments, all durable goods manufacturers.
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the usual eight to twelve months after busi-
ness troughs were acknowledged (Table 8,
line 5 or 6). Can this taming of inventory
movements be explained in terms of the firm
rein on stock management afforded by electric
data processing? Before this popular explana-
tion is accepted, we shall need to move as far
as possible toward understanding some of the
factors other than sales which seem to influence
materials ownership. Chapter [1 returns to the
question and recommends a different answer.
The facts that have been assembled describe
the character of the participation of durable
goods manufacturers' stocks of materials on
hand and on order in business fluctuation,
one of the two questions to which the behavior
of the time series are referred. Outstanding
orders for materials appear to be large—about
half as large as all stocks and twice as large as
materials stocks. The facts point to movements
that correspond to business cycles,to the
presence of two minor movements in outstand-
ings, to leads in the outstandings segment. We
have seen also that the amplitude of fluctua-
tion is strong—greater than can be accounted
for by fluctuations in shipments alone, even
assuming that it was actually necessary for
stocks to increase or decrease as much as ship-
ments, an assumption which Chapter 2 denied.
We saw also that whatever stimulating influ-
ence on the economy is generated by increases
in outstandings was particularly strong in the
first year of expansion.
Most of these observations also have some
bearing on the dynamics of change in stocks
on hand and on order, the second major ques-
tion concerning which information is to be
assembled. Of particular interest in this con-
nection is the large size of outstandings, their
tendency to parallel stocks though with a lead
which at peaks is longer than can be readily
explained. The early thrusts likewise require
explanation in terms of the business problems
that they reflect.
It will be useful to summarize these several
findings somewhat more carefully since they
are hard to fasten in memory. However, the
summary will be more useful if it also covers
a parallel study of department stores. Behavior
is more noteworthy if it is found in enterprises
as different as the large retail store and the
manufacturer of heavy equipment. Insofar as
a characteristic is not repeated in these very
different industries, it is useful to try to learn
why.